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n few countries have modern income tax
reforms been governed by overall economic
principles to the same extent as in Norway. This is
primarily due to the influential role of a number of
government-appointed committees whose reports
have set the agenda for tax reform in Norway dur-
ing the last two decades.The first was the Report of
the Tax Commission in 1984 (NOU 1984) that insti-
gated a series of reform steps during the eighties.
The second, and big milestone, was the Report of
the Aarbakke Committee in 1989 (NOU 1989)
which led to a structural overhaul of the tax sys-
tem.The overall purpose was to establish a tax sys-
tem based on sound economic principles that
would promote an efficient allocation of capital,
while at the same time limiting the distortion of
capital accumulation.The resulting introduction of
a new income tax system from the beginning of
1992 - to become known as the dual income tax -
was seen by many in Norway as the ultimate tax
reform that had finally furnished the country with
a durable income tax system that would guarantee
adherence to major economic principles.
This verdict may seem ill founded, or at least over-
ly optimistic, in view of the fact that only eleven
years later a third report, submitted by the Skauge
Committee (NOU 2003), proposed further reform
steps, partly undoing some of the elements of the
previous reform. Two kinds of problems had been
underestimated at the time of the Aarbakke
report. One was the information and enforcement
problems inherent in the system, that were to
become increasingly noticeable and urgent as over
time the economic agents found ways to adapt to
the new system. Another was the lack of political
commitment to basic principles beyond the short
term. We shall return to these problems and how
they have been addressed after reviewing the main
features of the 1992 income tax system.
The 1992 reform
Taking a quick look further back in time, we may
note that Norway entered the eighties with very high
statutory tax rates applied to labour as well as capi-
tal income.With full deductibility of interest expens-
es, while tax favours were granted to a number of
assets, there was a strong concern that this asymme-
try induced excessive borrowing for socially unprof-
itable investment. A major contribution of the Tax
Commission, was to put an end to a lengthy debate
on the deductibility of interest payments in Norway
by proposing major cuts in marginal tax rates that
contributed considerably to eliminating the harmful
(dis)incentive effects on accumulation of debt and
assets while still retaining full deductibility. By
increasing pay roll taxes and social insurance contri-
butions, levied only on labour income, not on capital
income, a step was in fact taken towards the future
introduction of a fully-fledged dual income tax dif-
ferentiating taxes on capital and labour income.
Prior to 1992 there was a wide recognition in
Norway that savings were low, the return to invest-
ment was low, and the investment allocation was
seriously distorted. The overall objective of the
1992 reform was to achieve a moderate taxation of
capital income that is neutral in a very broad sense,
while maintaining the distributional role of a pro-
gressive tax on labour income (see also Sørensen
1994).A linear capital income tax with a tax rate of
28 per cent was introduced. The ideal was that no
tax favours should be granted to specific types of
investment, certain organisational forms, or partic-
ular sources of finance.Marginal tax cuts were com-
bined with base broadening and the elimination of
a variety of opportunities for firms to make use of
deductions and tax-favoured funds, often to defer
tax payments more or less indefinitely.Efforts were
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true economic depreciation. The principles laid
down by the Aarbakke committee had far-reaching
implications for practical tax policy.
Derived from the desirability of neutrality and sym-
metry in the taxation of capital, the ideal was single
taxation of all kinds of capital income at a uniform
rate, also applied to negative income such as mort-
gage interest expenses. To avoid discrimination of
corporate income and hence corporate investment it
was considered crucial to have no double taxation of
profits accruing to shareholders either as dividends
or capital gains. Two innovations were essential for
this purpose. An imputation system was devised to
ensure single taxation. Once profits have been taxed
at the corporate level the shareholder is granted full
credit against the personal tax on dividends. A fur-
ther innovation was required to extend single taxa-
tion to capital gains that should not be taxed to the
extent that they reflect retentions of already-taxed
earnings. There was a need to separate the latter
from capital gains due to exogenous and random
events. The method, called RISK (a Norwegian
acronym), implies that the tax value of shares is
adjusted for profit retentions. By stepping up the
value basis a smaller taxable gain will materialise at
the time of realisation. The commitment to single
taxation is ambitious, and the RISK scheme has
proved administratively costly.
As we have seen, a key premise of the reform was
that capital income should be taxed differently and
on the whole by a lower marginal tax rate than
labour income. It is interesting to observe how the
motivation for a lower capital income tax has shift-
ed over time. While the first reforms to that end
were justified mainly by the concern with excessive
borrowing, the motivation gradually shifted
towards the concern with international mobility of
capital - an argument virtually non-existent in the
early eighties. A particular aspect, often drawn
attention to at a time when the inflation rate was
much higher than today, was the confiscatory real
effect of nominal taxation driving the nominal
after-tax interest rate below the inflation rate.
Even if the intention of the 1992 reform was to
achieve uniform and neutral taxation of all kinds
of capital income, realistic, experience-based
expectations were probably that in practice certain
investments would remain tax favoured. A way to
limit the resulting distortion is then to tax ordinary,
non-preferential investments relatively mildly,
which is a further low-tax argument (see also
Nielsen and Sørensen 1997).
Obviously differential taxation of labour and capital
makes it necessary to distinguish labour and capital
income in practice – in itself a daunting task as for
self-employed no such distinction is readily avail-
able. As their aggregate income originates from the
capital they have invested as well as the labour effort
they put in,there is in practice no obvious way to dis-
entangle the two theoretically distinct kinds of
income.A method for splitting the income – referred
to as the income splitting model – had to be con-
structed. The purpose is to single out for income
splitting those firms whose owners are also working
in the firm as managers, or even taking part in pri-
mary production activities. These owners are
labelled “active owners”. Income splitting is manda-
tory for sole proprietorships, partnerships and cor-
porations with active owners.For the owners to qual-
ify as active owners, they must own at least two
thirds of the firm, and each one must work in the
firm for a minimum number of hours per year.
With a few qualifications the approach taken in the
Norwegian tax system is to define capital income
by imputing a return to the stock of business assets
and then to calculate the labour income as the
residual income.The imputed rate of return is stip-
ulated as the interest rate on five year government
bonds plus a risk premium of four percent.1 The
rationale for the imputed return is that it may be
interpreted as the return that could be obtained
elsewhere and is in this sense an opportunity cost
of capital.In other words it is the return that would
be required in order to invest in a particular busi-
ness in the absence of taxes. By taxing the business
as if the imputed return were obtained, the tax will
not bias the investment decision either way, and
neutrality is achieved.
There are two qualifications to the splitting
method sketched above, that may be worth men-
tioning. One is that residual income over and
above a certain threshold is considered to be capi-
tal income.(Exceptions to this rule apply to certain
professions – doctors, brokers, lawyers, etc.). The
other qualification is that active owners with
employees are entitled to make a “salary deduc-
tion” from the residual before arriving at the final
CESifo DICE Report 3/2004 10
Forum
1 Whether a risk premium should be added is a controversial issue
among tax economists.CESifo DICE Report 3/2004 11
Forum
estimate of labour income.The salary deduction is
20 percent of the wage bill. It has been argued that
this deduction may make up for missing inclusion of
self-created goodwill in the stock of business assets
and that firms with many employees would other-
wise be assigned an unreasonably high labour
income.It is probably fair to say that the various ele-
ments of the splitting model have to some extent
been played around with as part of a political game
motivated in part by the concern of politicians of
various colours with special interest groups. Certain
key rules were changed after the principal reform in
1992, detached from its overall perspective, and at
odds with the advice of the Aarbakke report. It is
thought provoking in this context that a large num-
ber of firms subject to the splitting model are in fact
assigned a negative labour income.
In line with the splitting rule different kinds of
income are taxed differently. If we – as seems nat-
ural – interpret the imputed return as a normal
rate of return on capital,the residual income will in
fact not only be labour income but may also con-
ceivably include monopoly rents, resource rents,
remuneration for high risk taking and particularly
favourable outcomes of random events. In this
sense the dual income tax does not only tax labour
income at a higher rate than “normal” capital
income but also imposes a surtax on various kinds
of rents.This appears to be an attractive feature of
the system as such taxes tend to be non-distor-
tionary. Generous salary deductions will however
erode this effect as more income is taxed at the low
rate. To the extent that risk is involved favourable
outcomes will, with the above qualifications, imply
a high tax burden as labour income is overestimat-
ed, whilst a loss will reduce the estimated labour
income and the corresponding tax burden. Hence
there is an element of risk-sharing between the pri-
vate investor and the government.
Beyond the general tax rules surveyed above there
are some special tax rules motivated by Norway’s
position as a resource-rich and sea-faring country.
Special surtaxes are imposed in the petroleum and
hydro-energy sectors as these are supposed to earn
a resource rent beyond the normal return to the
invested capital. Ship-owning companies only pay
income tax when profits are distributed and not as
long as profits are retained within the company. In
this sense there is a tax deferral.While the tax rules
devised to appropriate part of the resource rents in
certain sectors have won the acclaim of most econ-
omists, the special tax rule for ship-owning compa-
nies has to a large extent been considered as a tax
privilege supported by well-resourced lobbying
rather than social efficiency arguments.
Taxed-favoured owner-occupied housing
Even though tax reforms in Norway have been
guided by economic principles to a large extent,tax
economists have never fully succeeded in convinc-
ing the politicians of the virtues of neutral capital
taxation, and shipping is not a sole example. The
most blatant violation of the principles of symme-
try and neutrality is due to the low value assess-
ment for tax purposes of selected assets. The most
striking example is owner-occupied housing,
including houses for leisure use, which has a long-
standing history as a tax-favoured asset.The value
assessment of houses for tax purposes is far – on
average perhaps 80 percent – below market value.
In this respect Norway differs significantly from
neighbouring Denmark and Sweden that are more
successful in equating tax values to market prices.
In addition to the low general valuation, there is in
Norway considerable variation across vintages of
houses, and there is a systematic bias in favour of
expensive houses as measured by the ratio
between the tax value and the price actually quot-
ed in the market for houses being traded. As rich
people typically own expensive houses, the report-
ed bias introduces an unintentional regressive tax
element. The preferential treatment of housing is
reinforced by the fact that taxpayers in wealth tax
position pay wealth tax on houses based on the tax
value.2 Owner occupied housing is the dominant
part of the housing market in Norway, and there is
extensive ownership of leisure houses. In view of
the size of the housing market and the importance
of houses as household assets, there is no doubt
that serious tax distortions are implied.
In spite of this economically sad fact, the present
government wants to phase out the income taxa-
tion of the imputed rent from owner-occupied
housing altogether.3 This step is exactly the oppo-
2 Two further taxes may be briefly mentioned. Local communities
may impose a property tax,which is also based on the tax value,but
few do. In principle there is a capital gains tax on houses, but none
is imposed if the seller has lived in the house for at least a rather
limited period of time.
3 Politicians will usually refer to the imputed rent tax as an ‘obso-
lete tax’,or point to alleged liquidity problems faced by some poor,
old widow.site of the policy recommended by the Skauge
committee. As pointed out by many economists,
this abolition is paradoxical at a time when there
appears to be increasing recognition of the need to
tax immobile rather than mobile assets in the face
of international tax competition.
The wealth tax 
Whereas several countries have abolished their
previous wealth tax, it is still retained in Norway
with rather high statutory tax rates. As there are
often cumulative effects of income and wealth
taxes,say,on savings and investment behaviour,the
two taxes should be considered in conjunction.
Even if the political attitude to the wealth tax in
Norway varies along the left-to-right political axis,
there is a widespread opinion that the present
wealth tax has serious deficiencies.
As it fails to achieve anything near uniform taxation
of various,major types of wealth,it strongly violates
the cherished principles of neutrality. Whilst some
assets such as bank deposits, bonds, and shares of
stock listed at the stock exchange are taxed accord-
ing to their market value, non-quoted shares and
quoted shares in small and medium-sized compa-
nies are entitled to an explicit ‘tax rebate’ of 35 per-
cent in terms of undervaluation. Various types of
real estate, including owner-occupied housing, are
even more tax-favoured assets. There seems to be
little political will to tighten the wealth tax. On the
contrary the political sentiment seems rather to be
in favour of gradually removing it.
Impacts of the 1992 reform
Presumably the 1992 reform induced both transito-
ry and more interesting structural effects. Even
bearing in mind the identification problems posed
by economic recovery and conceivable after-
effects of economic liberalisation in the years sub-
sequent to the reform,observations of after-reform
changes and preliminary results from economic
analyses of the reform are interesting from the per-
spective of allocation as well as distribution.4There
are strong indications that the (pre-tax) return to
capital has shifted to a higher level and that the
dispersion of rates of return has narrowed. Both
results would be consistent with the intentions of
the reform since the old tax regime implied larger
general tax wedges as well as differential tax treat-
ment that were likely to generate unequal margin-
al returns to investment in various sectors.
Studies based on computable general equilibrium
models have estimated the efficiency gain from
more uniform capital taxation at 0.75 percent in
terms of the equivalent increase in private con-
sumption. Real investment has shifted to a lower
level, while the after-tax real interest rate and the
households’ savings rate have increased.
Subsequent to the reform there has been a sharp
rise in distributed profits. This can partly be
ascribed to transitory effects having to do with the
removal of legal constraints on the scope for dis-
tributing funds previously accumulated partly in
order to obtain a tax credit. But even apart from
such cases, retentions were tax-favoured compared
to distribution of dividends, and capital was locked
into the companies with potentially harmful alloca-
tive effects.
Income inequality has increased somewhat during
the nineties, and it has been debated whether the
tax reform is to be blamed for this development.
The observations that are reported are illustrative
of the problems involved in comparing before- and
after- reform distribution as the income concepts
used do not reflect the same underlying economic
reality. Previously some of the true income of
shareholders was concealed as profits retained in
the corporations, and the corresponding capital
gains never, or only much delayed, materialised as
shareholder income. Now the more extensive dis-
tribution of dividends after the reform is immedi-
ately registered as an increase in income.A further
question is how the taxes for a given base affect the
distribution of after-tax income as compared to
pre-tax income. It has been revealed that the tax
system is slightly less progressive than it was prior
to the reform. However, it turns out that this is
mainly due to inadequate adjustment to increases
in certain deductions and child benefits. This was
never part of the 1992 reform.
Effects for which the reform must take full respon-
sibility are those related to income splitting.Whilst
income splitting with its risk sharing property may
seem appealing from an ex ante point of view,own-
ers of firms that have already been successful may
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view things differently. Rather than having a sub-
stantial part of their income taxed as labour income
they would like to have it taxed leniently at the rate
applied to capital income. It follows that if a signif-
icant part of the income is taxed at high tax rates
there is strong motivation for finding ways to trans-
form labour income into low-taxed capital income.
This is indeed what many Norwegian entrepreneurs
do. Especially active owners of corporations have
escaped the split model. One way to do this is to
invite more passive owners into the company to
bring the ownership share of active owners below
66 percent. Between 1992 and 2000 the percentage
of corporations subject to income splitting fell from
55 to 32. By avoiding mandatory income splitting
the owners are free to work for a very low official
salary, whilst reaping large dividends. In particular
it has caught the public eye how a number of
celebrities in show business and TV production
manage to acquire most of their income in terms of
capital income through corporations.
The extensive circumvention of the income splitting
model figures as the major deficiency, some would
say the Achilles Heel,of the tax system introduced in
1992. This problem was a major motivation for
appointing the Skauge committee that delivered its
report in 2003. Below I will concentrate on its pro-
posals addressing the income splitting problem as
these are about to win political acceptance.
The road ahead 
It is corporations with active owners that have posed
the most serious problems for the income splitting
scheme.The key element of the proposed solution is
to replace the previous income splitting model for
active shareholders by a sophisticated income tax
model for all personal shareholders (see Sørensen
2003).The previous imputation system as well as the
RISK scheme will be removed. A personal share-
holder tax will be imposed on share income exceed-
ing a risk-free rate of return.The idea is to approxi-
mate the marginal tax on high share income to a
somewhat lowered marginal labour tax in order to
remove the motivation for income shifting, while
preserving the low tax on ‘normal’ capital income.
For this dual purpose the tax base is defined by
deducting a so-called rate-of-return allowance
(RRA) from the share income consisting of divi-
dends and any realised net capital gain.The role of
the RRA is to shield the imputed risk-free return.
The after-tax corporation profit may be distributed
as dividends or retained within the corporation
presumably generating a capital gain by pushing up
the share price. In any given year the shareholder
will receive the distributed dividend and keep or
sell the share. If the share is kept the income being
taxed at the hand of the shareholder is the divi-
dend minus the RRA. To the extent that the divi-
dend falls short of the RRA the difference is
defined as unutilised RRA. The RRA is the prod-
uct of the after-tax interest rate and a basis value of
the share. The calculation of the basis takes as its
point of departure the acquisition price of the
share and then steps up this basis at the beginning
of each year by adding any unutilised RRA.
The shareholder income tax can be shown to have
a number of appealing neutrality properties with
respect to investment allocation, choice of funding
between injection of new equity or retained earn-
ings and the timing of realisation of shares. The
step-up in the basis for calculating the RRA is cru-
cial for these properties. Beyond leaving the mar-
ginal investment unaffected, the shareholder
income tax appropriates without distortions some
of the above-normal profits on infra-marginal pro-
jects. Ex post it will tax away some of the returns
due to favourable states of the world under uncer-
tainty,but we should observe that ex ante this tax is
offset in expectation terms by the prospect of tax
savings in the event of losses being deductible
against contemporary gains on other shares or
against future gains after being carried forward
with interest to preserve their present value.
For sole proprietors and partnerships the proposal
is to apply a revised version of the income splitting
model which is close in spirit to the shareholder
income tax model. A risk-free imputed return to
business assets,called the “shielded return”,will be
taxed as capital income while income beyond this
level will be taxed as labour income.There is to be
no cap on profits to be taxed as personal income,
no “salary deduction” from taxable profits, and the
same rule will apply to the professions such as
lawyers, brokers, etc. and other tax subjects.
Concerns with international agreements 
Even though not a member of the EU,Norway is in
several respects affected by the EU legislation viathe European Economic Area (EEA) and the
underlying agreement between the EU and Efta
countries. A Finnish case (the Manninen case) on
the agenda of the EU Court has caused concern in
Norway that the Norwegian tax rules for shares
may be found incompatible with the non-discrimi-
nation rules of the EEA as Norwegian and Finnish
rules have strong similarities. The present imputa-
tion system and RISK rules,preventing double tax-
ation of distributed and retained profits,apply only
to income from corporations that are Norwegian
tax subjects and shareholders who are liable to pay
ordinary income tax in Norway. Shareholders of
Norwegian corporations who are foreign tax sub-
jects normally have to pay a source tax on top of
the corporate tax already paid. Share income from
foreign companies accruing to shareholders who
are Norwegian tax subjects is taxed as capital
income in Norway irrespective of the corporate tax
liability abroad.(The only qualification is potential
crediting against foreign source taxes.) I believe
that these legal aspects of international commit-
ments have affected the political climate in
Norway in favour of introducing a shareholder
income tax even among those politicians who have
a reputation for fiercely opposing high/double tax-
ation of dividends.
Concluding remark
The ambitious Norwegian dual income tax experi-
ment is interesting as it illustrates both the scope
for and the limits to a tax policy trying to pursue
economic principles in a high tax country, with an
open economy and a strong emphasis on the distri-
butional role of taxes. It illuminates how theory
meets reality both in the form of political con-
straints and formidable problems with enforcing
universal principles in practice.I would like to con-
clude that in order to redress important allocation
failures, huge reforms have indeed been imple-
mented, admittedly facing problems and set-backs,
but certainly not without some measure of success.
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